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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT. 
Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee Lynn A. Jenkins I., ("Mr. Jenkins" 
hereinafter) pro se, submits his APPELLANT'S BRIEF and represents the Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to §78-2-2.(3)0) and (4) Utah Code 
Anno., "The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,... over: ... (j) orders, judgments, 
and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original 
appellate jurisdiction; and ... (4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of 
Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction". 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Did the court err when it ruled Mr. Jenkins' September 13, 1999 Notice of Interest 
was a wrongful lien as defined by §38-9-1 et seg.? The standard of review is Salt 
Lake County, v. Metro West Ready Mix, 453 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah Ct. App. 
2002) citing Horman V. Clark, 744 P2d 1014, 1016 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
II. Did the court err by recognizing the Plaintiffs as the owners of the Weber County 
real property on September 13, 1999, the date of recording of the Notice of Interest 
by Mr. Jenkins? The standard of review is supra, Metro West, TJ13, citing Ault v. 
Holden, 2002 Ut 33, ^42, 44 P.3d 781 " .... (2) whether the purported owner 
possessed the property." 
IIL Did the court err in granting the Plaintiffs damages from falsified affidavits they 
presented to the court reporting fraudulent amounts for work they claimed, when 
in fact those damages, if any, were sustained by Country West Construction and 
Real Estate Company Inc., through its subdivision improvement contracts with 
Roy City on Countrybrook Subdivision Unit No. 10?. Standard of review is 
Glauser Storage v. Smedley, 2001 UT App 141, ^28 ".... Utah R. Evid. 608(a). 
'Opinion testimony concerning credibility must be limited to testimony addressing 
a witness's general reputation for truthfulness, leaving the resolution of credibility 
for the fact-finder.' State v. Hovt, 806 P.2d 204, 211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
- l -
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Did the court err in giving attorneys' fees to the Plaintiffs? Standard of review is 
supra, Ault at T|46 citing ".... Whether a party may recover attorney fees in an 
action is a question of law ..." Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102,1f2l, 20 
P.3d 868 and |^47 "In Utah, attorney fees are typically awarded only pursuant to 
statute or Contract. Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, ^|69, 44 P.3d 663. 
Did the court err in not recognizing Mr. Jenkins' standing as an "accommodation 
party" of the res of the trust created in July 1990? Standard of review is Utah 
Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Watts, 737 P.2d 154, 158 (Utah !987) u[4] 
Whether a person is an accommodation party is a question of intent. In other 
words, it is a question of the intentions of person claimed to be an accommodation 
party, the person who would be the accommodated party, and the person who was 
holder of the paper when the alleged accommodation party signed." 
Did the court err in not granting Mr. Jenkins a jury trial? . Standard of review is 
Salt Lake City v. Roseto, 2002 UT App 66 ^ [13 .... However, the right to a jury trial 
provided by the United States and Utah Constitutions establishes the minimum 
right to which our citizens are entitled ..." 
Did the court err in releasing Country West Construction and Real Estate 
Company Inc.'s, $30,000 held in trust by a title insurance company for Mr. Jenkins 
without Country West being made a party to the cause of action? Standard of 
review is Utah Rules of Civil Procedures Rule 171 and Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 
767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988). 
Did the trial court err in not establishing that Plaintiff Countrybrook LLC, was in 
fact the partnership and/or joint venture and/or the alter ego of the Smedley Family 
Investment Company, Triple S. Trust, Dale T. Smedley and Helen B. Smedley? 
Standard of review is Norman v. Arnold, 453 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 2002 UT 81, j^29 
".... the Utah Partnership Act 'governs the property and transfer rights of joint 
ventures." 
Did court err in granting summary judgment to the Plaintiffs on all issues when in 
fact there are material issues of fact to be adjudicate? Standard of review is 
WebBank. et al. v. American General Annuity Service Corp., 2002 UT 88, ^ [10 "A 
trial court may properly grant summary judgment when 'there is no genuine issues 
as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law.' Utah R. Civ. P. 56( c ); see also, Holmes Development LLC v. Cook, 2002 
UT 38,1(21. 
Did the trial court err in its ruling that Mr. Jenkins could not transfer the cause of 
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action to the Morgan County 2 Judicial District Court and/or amend his Answer 
to name third party defendants, such as Dale T. Smedley, Helen B. Smedley, the 
Smedley Family Investment Company, Mountain View Title and Escrow 
Company, Chambers and the Wolfleys, Roy City, Barnes Bank, Country West 
Construction and Real Estate Company Inc., and/or other Does I-X? Standard of 
review is WebBank, et ah v. American General Annuity Service Corp., 2002 UT 
88: 
STATEMENT OF CASE: 
July 20, 1990, in the 2nd Judicial District Court, Davis County, in concurrence with 
a Stipulated Judgment,2 Mr. Jenkins through his Residential Mortgage Company Inc., as a 
pledger in accommodation3 for Edwin M. Higley, Smedley Family Investment Company, 
Dale T. Smedley,4 Helen B. Smedley, C. DeMont Judd Trustee of the Triple S Trust, 
Walter Barton, Mary Barton, Keystone Ranch, a.k.a. Wolfley Ranch in Lemhi County, 
Idaho and the Federal Land Bank of Spokane; by Special Warranty Deed [a copy is 
attached hereto as A TTACHMENT "A " as if fully set forth by this reference] to attorney 
Joseph M. Chambers, as Trustee in Trust ("Chambers" hereinafter) for DeLoy E. Wolfley 
and Marie Wolfley ("Wolfley" hereinafter) by placing approximately 6.20 acres of land 
("res of the trust"), a partial Weber County ownership plat is attached hereto as 
ATTACHMENT "B" as if fully set forth herein by this reference, which was then part of 
an approved Roy City subdivision containing 34 building lots (Mr. Jenkins' property 
contained only 24 lots of the total lots) [originally known as "Countrybrook Subdivision 
No. 2", and in 1990 the First America Equity Trust Subdivision a copy is attached hereto 
as ATTACHMENT "C", as if fully set forth by this reference],5 as security for the 
pa;/ment on two judgments entered in two separate counties in the 2nd Judicial District 
Courts, DELOY WOLFLEY v. EDWIN M. HIGLEY. ("HIGLEY" hereinafter), the 
Davis County Stipulated Judgment was in the amount of $12,000.00, as of May 29, 
1990,6 and the Morgan County 2nd Judicial District Court case being DELOY E. 
WOLFLEY and MARIA WOLFLEY v. SMEDLEY FAMILY INVESTMENT CO. a 
Utah Partnership. DALE T. SMEDLEY and HELEN B. SMEDLEY. husband and wife, 
and C. DEMONT JUDD. Trustee of the Triple S. Trust W/A 12-1-83. ("WOLFLEY" 
hereinafter) alleged to be in the amount of $30,548.25, plus $3,800.00 for attorney's fees 
and $68.75 costs, the total of $34,417.00 as of April 15, 1985, (purportedly on or about 
September 15, 1986 the Morgan County Court awarded the Wolfleys another judgment in 
the amount of $18,413.00 plus $2,500.00 attorney fee or a total of $20,913.00, but, on 
October 8, 1985, it offset $48,000.00 [four Bear Lake lots] and $20,155.88), also, 
Chambers was to release a foreign judgment7 the Wolfleys' had filed in Lemhi County.8 
The original [ 1977 to 1999] Smedley Family Investment Company consisted of 
Dale T. Smedley, his wife Helen B. Smedley and their children with their spouses, which 
Company was not recorded in Utah nor Idaho, as required by Utah Idaho law. There has 
been no winding up of the affairs of that family partnership nor known accounting of its 
assets or its disillusionment. 
A new Smedley Family Investment Company LLC, was created in July 1999 after 
the Wolfleys obtained from a new 1995 Morgan County lawsuit a stipulated judgment 
against .SMEDLEY FAMILY INVESTMENT CO. a Utah Partnership, DALE T. 
SMEDLEY and HELEN B. SMEDLEY, husband and wife, and TRIPLE S. TRUST. 
-4-
The Plaintiff, Appellee and Cross Appellant Countrybrook LLC ("Countrybrook 
LLC" hereinafter) was created on or about March 30, 1997 and recorded with the State of 
Utah April 17, 1997 its members being some of the children of Dale T. Smedley. and 
Helen B. Smedley and members of Smedley Family Investment Company. Those 
members being Plaintiff, Appellee and Cross Appellant Terry D. Smedley, his wife 
Susanne S. Smedley, Scott Standing, his wife Lori [Smedley] Standing, Kelly D. Lane 
and his wife Melanie S. [Smedley] Lane. 
These following facts are set forth to establish that the Plaintiffs are either the 
alter-egos of Dale T. Smedley and Helen B. Smedley or they are their silent joint 
venturers in the development of the res of the trust and controlled the Countrybrook 
Subdivision Units, as herein stated;. 
(1) Country West Construction and Real Estate Company Inc., purchased 
Countrybrook Subdivisions Unit No. 3 [five lots] {ATTACHMENT "D" 
hereto), Unit No. 9, {A TTACHMENT "E" hereto) and Unit No. 10 
(A TTACHMENT "F" hereto) from Dale T. Smedley as the 
owner/developer and Terry D. Smedley whom acted as the real estate sales 
agent for those sales through Country West's Real Estate Brokerage; 
(2) Mark Higley Construction Inc., purchased part of Countrybrook 
Subdivision Unit No. 3, (see: ATTACHMENT "Dyr) from Dale T. Smedley, 
however, Mr. Smedley used a third-party MESCO Inc., who had obtained a 
loan for the Unit No. 3 Subdivision from Barnes Bank; 
(3) The engineering firm of Knighton and Crow reported "Dale T. Smedley 
hired it to do some Countrybrook Subdivision design work as the 
owner/developer {see: ATTACHMENTS "C" and "/)");" 
(4) The engineering firm of Reeves & Associates reported "Dale T. 
Smedley hired it to design and layout the Countrybrook Subdivisions Unit 
No. 3, Unit No. 9, and Unit No. 10 (see: ATTACHMENTS "D", "E" and 
-5-
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"F") also, Dale T. Smedley was the owner/developer;" 
(5) The Army Corps of Engineers reported that "Dale T. Smedley was the 
applicant and was shown as the owner/developer for the Countrybrook 
Subdivisions wetlands along the Howard Slough"(Deeded to Roy City 
Corporation in June 1999 as a wetland preserve); and 
(6) Roy City has stated "Dale T. Smedley reported to them he was the 
owner/developer of the Countrybrook Subdivisions." 
Roy City Corporation gave no consideration for the wetland parcels from Plaintiff 
Terry Smedley (approximately 1.062 acre), a portion of the land contained in the Notice 
of Interest real property description [see: ATTACHMENT "C" and its blue area] in June 
1999, but had issued, as of December 4, 1999, IRS Form 8283 donation grants to: Terry 
Smedley $6,724.00, and $64,830.00, Scott Standing $6,723.00, and Kelly Lane $6,725.00 
[no consideration was given to Countrybrook LLC]. 
September 13, 1999 Mr. Jenkins caused a Notice of Real and/or Personal Property 
Interests9 in Weber County, Utah (the "Notice of Interest" hereinafter, a copy is attached 
hereto as ATTACHMENT "G", as if fully set forth herein by this reference) to be 
recorded ... as Entry No. 1662048, in Book 2033, beginning at Page 2061 and ending on 
Page 2062 [see: ATTACHMENTS "A " and "B" hereto]. The Notice of Interest included 
Countrybrook Subdivision Unit No. 3 [see: ATTACHMENT "D"], part of Unit No. 9, 
[see: ATTACHMENT "E'% part of Unit No. 10 [see: ATTACHMENT "F" ] and a small 
parcel of land Mr. Jenkins had agreed to donate to Roy City Corporation in 1990 [see: 
ATTACHMENT "C" the blue color area]. 
The Notice of Interest states: "Notice is hereby given by LYNN A. JENKINS I., 
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... he claims an interest in the real and/or personal property which is the subject matter of 
three civil actions pending, in the District Courts of the Second Judicial District, for 
Weber, Davis and Morgan Counties, state of Utah, which actions are affecting his rights 
..., claims ..., title ... in such property located in Weber County, Utah,... FURTHER, the 
property as placed in trust by Lynn A. Jenkins I., the successor and President of 
Residential Mortgage Inc., a Utah corporation, with Trustee Joseph M. Chambers Esq., 
was for subdivision development with DeLoy E. Wolfley and Maria Wolfley, and relates 
to the subject matter of two civil actions pending in the District Court of Lemhi County, 
state of Idaho, which actions relate to Residential Mortgage's Trust on or about July 20, 
1990, by 'SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED given to JOSEPH M. CHAMBERS, AS 
TRUSTEE, in Trust for DELOY E. WOLFLEY and MARIA WOLFLEY/" 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Jenkins would allege, Utah's Wrongful Lien Law is in direct conflict with 
Utah law which allows a person to act as an accommodation maker, too establish a trust 
by Special Warranty Deed, petition for redress of a wrong, fails to recognize a person's 
rights to due process, equal protection, right for a jury trial, accord and satisfaction, deal 
wi :h the real parties-in-interest. Its statutory mandates provide for huge attorney fees and 
triple damages, which denies a person an open court system, if that party defendant is pro 
se for lack of available resources, such as cash, and is not entitled to claim huge legal 
fees, while a plaintiff, being represented by members of the Utah State Bar can bring suit 
and charge tens of thousands dollars without fear the courts will challenge them or their 
-7-
veracity. ALSO, it allows the plaintiffs, who lack standing, to represent third-parties such 
as Dale T. Smedley, Helen B. Smedley, Smedley Family Investment Company and 
allegedly Roy City Corporation.
 lX 
ARGUMENTS - :± 
L Did the court err when it ruled Mr. Jenkins' September 13, 1999 Notice of Interest 
was a wrongful lien as defined by §38-9-1 ei seqP. 
This Court in Metro West Ready Mix. 453 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah Ct. App. 
2002) citing Horman, 744 P2d 1014, 1016 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) explained why a person 
would file a notice of interest: 
Tf6 .... Furthermore, this court has stated that the purpose of the Recording 
Statute [§§53-3-102,G, -103]11 i s not to make the transfer of property effective as 
between the parties, but protect the purchaser's interest against third parties, and to 
inform third parties of the existence of pre-existing encumbrances on the property,' 
The Notice of Interest was filed by Mr. Jenkins to inform third parties he claimed 
an interest in the Weber County property by virtue of Special Warranty Deed [see: 
ATTACHMENT "A "] he signed as an accommodation, primarily for HIGLEY who had 
been sued by the Wolfleys to recover some life insurance that he had failed to provide as 
agreed in the purchase of the Wolfleys' Keystone Ranch located northeast of Carman, 
Lemhi County, Idaho. The Wrongful Lien Act was placed by the Utah Legislature under 
Title 38 for LIENS with the following: -, .. <. 
§38-9-1 •Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful 
property interest in certain real property, including an owner, title holder, 
mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner. 
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property who offers 
a document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a 
lien or other claim of interest in certain real property. 
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in certain real property. 
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, 
lawful property interest in certain real property, including an owner, titleholder, 
mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and interest in that real 
property appears in the county recorder's records for the county in which the 
property is located. 
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in certain 
real property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records for the county in 
which the property is located. 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is 
recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state; or 
©) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real 
property. 
First: the Plaintiffs, Appellees and Cross-Appellants represented themselves as 
owners of the real property, when in fact they were not owners at the time Mr. Jenkins 
recorded the Notice of Interest [see: ATTACHMENT "G "] nor have they subsequently 
obtained record title as required by the Wrongful Lien statute; Second: there are several 
Utah statutes which authorizes the filing of a Notice of Interest upon real property and it's 
no: limited to the following: 
§57-9-4. Filing of notice of claim of interest authorized - Effect of possession 
of land by record owner of possessory interest. 
(1) Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve and keep effective such 
interest by filing for record during the forty-year period immediately following the 
effective date of the root of title of the person whose record title would otherwise 
be marketable, a notice in writing, duly verified by oath, setting forth the nature of 
the claim. No disability or lack of knowledge of any kind on the part of anyone 
shall suspend the running of the forty-year period. The notice may be filed for 
-9-
•^wPiW^wiiiiiiiiiiMiii mm mmmmmmmmmmmmmmm 
record by the claimant or by any other person acting in behalf of any claimant who 
is 
(a) under a disability, 
(b) unable to assert a claim on his own behalf, or 
©) one of a class, but whose identity cannot be established or is uncertain at the 
time of filing the notice of claim for record. 
(2) If the same record owner of any possessory interest in land has been in 
possession of such land continuously for a period of forty years or more, during 
which period no title transaction with respect to such interest appears of record in 
his chain of title, and no notice has been filed by him or on his behalf as provided 
in Subsection (1), and such possession continues to the time when marketability is 
being determined, such period of possession shall be deemed equivalent to the 
filing of the notice immediately preceding the termination of the forty-year period 
described in Subsection (1). 
AND/OR ' r 
Article I, Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and 
liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the 
dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and 
opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
Third: Utah's statutes provide that due process to extinguish a Notice of Interest to 
be a Quiet Title Action not a Wrongful Lien Action. 
§78-40-1. Action to determine adverse claim to property — Authorized. 
An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest 
in real property or an interest or claim to personal property adverse to him, for the 
purpose of determining such adverse claim. 
//. Did the court err by recognizing the Plaintiffs as the owners of the Weber County 
real property on September 13, 1999, the date of recording of the Notice of 
Interest by Mr, Jenkins? 
The court failed to require the Plaintiffs to show not only that they were owners of 
the real property also, it was required to establish whether it ever possessed the property, 
supra, Metro West. 1(13, citing Auh, 2002 Ut 33, ^42, 44 P.3d 781 " .... (2) whether the 
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purported owner possessed the property." Mr. Jenkins before he settled with Country 
West in November 1999, obtained a copy of the Weber County Ownership Plat a copy of 
which is attached hereto as ATTACHMENT "H" and incorporated herein as if fully set 
forth by this reference. Also, a Preliminary Title Report from Bonneville Title Company 
which PR showed no ownership or claim to the real property by either of the Plaintiffs. 
Further, Mr. Jenkins instead of taking the $30,000.00 offered to him by Country 
West Construction and Real Estate Company Inc., placed the money in trust with their 
Title Insurance Company for a defense fund against Dale T. Smedley, his Smedley 
Family Investment Company, and the litigation pending in Idaho on the Wolfley Ranch, 
as stated in the Notice of Interest. Clearly the actions of the Plaintiffs were to defraud Mr. 
Jenkins, as an accommodation pledger of his remaining value [approximately $600,000.] 
after satisfaction of the Wolfleys' Stipulated Judgment. Further, Metro West, f 10, cites 
State v. Redd. 1999 UT 108,... [^12, 992 P.2d 986 "(stating that courts avoid interpreting 
statues in such a manner as to absurd consequences)." 
///. Did the court err in granting the Plaintiffs damages from falsified affidavits they 
presented to the court reporting fraudulent amounts for work they claimed, when in fact 
those damages, if any, were sustained by Country West Construction and Real Estate 
Company Inc., through its subdivision improvement contracts with Roy City on 
Countrybrook Subdivision Unit No. 10?. 
Dale T. Smedley died in September 2002, sadly to state his family, the Plaintiffs 
are following their father's tradition of being less than honest in their business dealings, 
i.e., they altered the estimated costs for subdivision improvements submitted by Reese 
and Associates to Barnes Bank, Roy City and Country West Construction in June 1999 
pertaining to development of Countrybrook Subdivision No. 10. See: Glauser Storage v. 
Smedlev. 2001 UT App 141, ^ [28 "... concerning credibility must be limited to testimony 
addressing a witness's general reputation for truthfulness, leaving the resolution of 
credibility for the fact-finder." State v. Hovt. 806 P.2d 204, 211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
These alterations and affidavits provided to the court by the Plaintiffs, it is alleged, 
convinced the court to exceed its authority and by granting payments to unlicenced 
contractors, plus attorneys' fees when in fact the real-party-in-interest was Country West 
Construction who have settled with Mr. Jenkins.. 
IV. Did the court err in giving attorneys 'fees to the Plaintiffs? 
Ault. at TJ46 citing ".... Whether a party may recover attorney fees in an action is a 
question of law ..." Warner v. DMG Color. Inc.. 2000 UT 102,1f21, 20 P.3d 868 and f47 
"In Utah, attorney fees are typically awarded only pursuant to statute or Contract". Miller 
v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 6,1J69,44 P.3d 663. Utah Wrongful Lien Act does 
allow for attorney's fees, however, Mr. Jenkins did not file the Notice of Interest pursuant 
to Title 38 as claimed by the Plaintiffs, but pursuant to Title 57 and Title 78. In this case 
the court, for some reason, wants to punish Mr. Jenkins for something he did not do and 
give the Plaintiffs their attorney fees from September 1999 without any consideration of 
the settlement he granted to Country West Construction, this is not reasonable and 
certainly not the intent of the language in Title 38 as enacted by the Utah Legislature. 
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V. Did the court err in not recognizing Mr. Jenkins' standing as an f<accommodation 
party " of the res of the trust created in July 1990? 
Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. Watts. 737 P.2d 154, 158 (Utah !987) u[4] 
Whether a person is an accommodation party is a question of intent. In other words, it is a 
question of the intentions of person claimed to be an accommodation party, the person 
who would be the accommodated party, and the person who was holder of the paper when 
the alleged accommodation party signed." Mr. Jenkins transferred the 6.2 acres of Weber 
County real property to Joseph Chambers in trust for the Wolfleys' 
VI. Did the court err in not granting Mr. Jenkins a jury trial? 
Standard of review is Salt Lake City v. Roseto, 2002 UT App 66 ^ [13 .... However, 
the right to a jury trial provided by the United States and Utah Constitutions establishes 
the; minimum right to which our citizens are entitled ..." 
VII. Did the court err in releasing Country West Construction and Real Estate 
Company Inc. 's, $30,000 held in trust by a title insurance company for Mr. 
Jenkins without Country West being made a party to the cause of action? 
Standard of review is Utah Rules of Civil Procedures Rule 17 and Cottonwood 
Mall v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988). Mr. Jenkins settled with the owner of the 
property, i.e., Country West Construction and Real Estate Company Inc., on or about 
November 23, 1999. Attached hereto as A TTACHMENTS "H" and "I", are Ownership 
Plats from Weber County which are incorporated herein by these references as if fully set 
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forth. These Attachments indicate the owners of the Notice of Interest's real property to 
be Country West Construction. The Plaintiff, Appellee and Cross-Appellant Terry D. 
Smedley deeded all his ownership to the Notice of Interest's real property on July 20, 
1999, two months before Mr. Jenkins filed his Notice of Interest on September 13, 1999. 
Plaintiff, Appellee and Cross-Appellant Countrybrook LLC, never had any recorded 
ownership to the Notice of Interest's real property. 
VIII. Did the trial court err in not establishing that Plaintiff Countrybrook LLC, was in 
fact the partnership and/or joint venture and/or the alter ego of the Smedley 
Family Investment Company, Triple S. Trust, Dale T. Smedley and Helen B. 
Smedley? 
Standard of review is Norman v. Arnold. 453 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 2002 UT 81, TJ29 
".... the Utah Partnership Act 'governs the property and transfer rights of joint ventures." 
The Plaintiffs, Appellees and Cross Appellants have a clear identity to Smedley Family 
Investment Company, Triple S. Trust, Dale T. Smedley and Helen B. Smedley, however 
the court refused to rule upon that central issue. If, as Mr. Jenkins has alleged, the 
Plaintiffs are the alter ego of Smedley Family Investment Company, Triple S. Trust, Dale 
T. Smedley and Helen B. Smedley, then their actions should be construed as a fraud upon 
the accommodation creditor to the res of the Wolfleys Trust and of course Utah law 
prohibits such fraudulent activities against a creditor. See: §48-1-38 Liability of persons 
continuing the business in certain cases.12 
IX. Did court err in granting summary judgment to the Plaintiffs on all issues when in 
fact there are material issues of fact to be adjudicate? 
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Standard of review is WebBank, et al. v. American General Annuity Service 
Corp., 2002 UT 88,1J10 "A trial court may properly grant summary judgment when 'there 
is no genuine issues as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.' Utah R. Civ. P. 56©); see also, Holmes Development LLC 
v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,1J21. ATTACHMENT "A", the July 20, 1990 Special Warranty 
Deed to Chambers for the creation of the Wolfley Trust needs to have an accounting and 
its issues resolved on appeal. WesBank, states: 
^19 "If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the 
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual 
language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Cent. Fla. 
Invests., Inc., 2002 UT 3 at ^ 12; see also Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43 at ^ 18; 
Dixon, 1999UT89at^l 13; Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108. However, if the language of 
the: contract is ambiguous such that the intentions of the parties cannot be 
determined by the plain language of the agreement, "extrinsic evidence must be 
looked to in order to determine the intentions of the parties." Cent. Fla. 
Invests., Inc., 2002 UT 3 at U 12; see also Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43 at ^ 18; 
Coco-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42 at ^ 9; SME Indus., Inc., 2001 UT 54 at H 14. If a 
contract is ambiguous, the court may consider the parties' actions and 
performance as evidence of the parties' true intention. See Plateau Mining Co., 
802P.2dat725. 
The Plaintiffs have taken Trustee Chambers' land stewardship and converted over 
$600,000 by conspiring with Dale T. Smedley to ignore the rights of Mr. Jenkins as he 
accommodated Higley and the Smedley clan in 1990 and he should have some 
consideration for those accommodations given. 
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X. Did the trial court err in its ruling that Mr. Jenkins could not transfer the cause of 
action to the Morgan County 2nd Judicial District Court and/or amend his Answer 
to name third party defendants, such as Dale T. Smedley, Helen B. Smedley, the 
Smedley Family Investment Company, Mountain View Title and Escrow Company, 
Chambers and the Wolfleys, Roy City, Barnes Bank, Country West Construction 
and Real Estate Company Inc., and/or other Does I-X? 
Standard of review is WebBank. et al. v. American General Annuity Service 
Corp,, 2002 UT 88: Mr. Jenkins would submit the September 13, 1999, Notice of Interest 
stated very clearly the facts concerning what he claimed: in fact, it cited the Morgan 
County 2nd Judicial Court as for the Jurisdiction of the Stipulation of Judgment that 
created the Wolfleys' Trust. Procedurally, Mr. Jenkins would allege, the court clearly 
erred when it retained jurisdiction of the wrongful lien action. Further, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedures, Rule 1513 would allow him to amend his answer to the complaint and 
allege third party claims. 
In light of Plaintiffs, Appellees and "Cross-Appellants claim that ROY CITY 
CORPORATION, instructed them to file suit against Mr. Jenkins concerning his 
September 13,1999 Notice of Interest and their claim for damages on the increased 
development costs of Countrybrook Subdivision Unit No. 10, has ROY CITY become an 
indispensable party, waiving its sovereign immunity to be sued or must the issue of 
damages be tried under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act? Standard of review is 
Laney. v. Fairview City. No. 981729, Filed August 9, 2002, 2002 UT 79 ^10 "City's 
decisions or omissions- ... -are discretionary functions for which sovereign immunity has 
no: been waived under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.: 
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Tf 15 The test used to determine whether a governmental act, omission, or 
decision qualifies as a discretionary function under section 63-30-10(1) 
requires a four-part inquiry. See Keegan v. State, 896 P.2d 618, 624 (Utah 
1995). An affirmative response to each inquiry leads to the conclusion that 
the action under review is a discretionary function. While the test was most 
recently applied by this court in Keegan, it first appeared in Little v. Utah 
State Division of Family Services. 667 P.2d49, 51 (Utah 1983), and 
includes the following: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a 
basic governmental policy, program, or objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or 
accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one 
which would not change the course or direction of the policy, program, or 
objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic policy 
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency 
involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite 
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the 
challenged act, omission, or decision? See Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624 (Utah 
1995); accord Trujillo v. Utah DepTt. of Transp.. 1999 UT App. 227, ^  27, 
986 P.2d 752; Little. 667 P.2d at 51 (quoting Evangelical United Brethren 
Church ofAdnav. State. 407 P.2d 440, 445 (Wash. 1965)). 
CONCLUSIONS 
March 23, 2000, the Utah Court of Appeals, in RUSSELL v. THOMAS. 2000 UT 
App 82 entered the first known appellant ruling on the 1997 re-codification of Utah's 
Wrongful Lien Statute and is on point as to a lien's qualification at the time of its 
recording [see:§38-9-l,4] The Plaintiff Countrybrook LLC, never was an owner of the 
real property stated in September 13, 1999„Notice of Interest and Plaintiff Terry D. 
Smedley released any and all ownership rights he claimed to Country West Construction 
and Real Estate Company Inc., in June and July 1999 and at best can only be classified as 
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an agent for ROY CITY. Mr. Jenkins and Country West Construction and Real Estate 
Company Inc., settled any and all claims they had or might haive had against each other in 
October and November 1999. In other words the Plaintiffs clearly have no standing to 
sue Mr. Jenkins on his September 13, 1999 Notice of Interest. 
ENDNOTES 
l. Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant. 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party 
wi ;h whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a 
pcirty authorized by statute may sue in that person's name without joining the party for 
whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use 
or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be 
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest 
until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement 
of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such 
ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been 
commenced in the name of the real party in interest. 
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. A minor or an insane or incompetent person who is a 
party must appear either by a general guardian or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the 
particular case by the court in which the action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be 
appointed in any case when it is deemed by the court in which the action or proceeding is 
prosecuted expedient to represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the action or 
proceeding, notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian and may have 
appeared by the guardian. In an action in rem it shall not be necessary to appoint a 
guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might be a minor or an incompetent person. 
( c ) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by a court must be 
appointed as follows: 
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if the minor is of the 
age of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the application of a relative or friend of 
the; minor. 
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(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if the minor is of the 
age of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after the service of the summons, or if 
under that age or if the minor neglects so to apply, then upon the application of a relative 
or friend of the minor, or of any other party to the action. 
(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon motion therefor, 
shall be entitled to an order designating some suitable person to be guardian ad litem for 
the minor defendant, unless the defendant or someone in behalf of the defendant within 
20 days after service of notice of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for 
such minor. Service of such notice may be made upon the defendant's general or 
testamentary guardian located in the defendant's state; if there is none, such notice, 
together with the summons in the action, shall be served in the manner provided for 
publication of summons upon such minor, if over fourteen years of age, or, if under 
fourteen years of age, by such service on the person with whom the minor resides. The 
guardian ad litem for such nonresident minor defendant shall have 20 days after 
appointment in which to plead to the action. 
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or proceeding, upon the 
application of a relative or friend of such insane or incompetent person, or of any other 
party to the action or proceeding. 
(d) Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two or more persons 
associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other 
association, not a corporation, transact such business under a common name, whether it 
comprises the names of such associates or not, they may sue or be sued by such common 
name. Any judgment obtained against the association shall bind the joint property of all 
the associates in the same manner as if all had been named parties and had been sued 
upon their joint liability. The separate property of an individual member of the association 
may not be bound by the judgment unless the member is named as a party and the court 
acquires jurisdiction over the member. 
(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a nonresident person is 
associated in and conducts business within the state of Utah in one or more places in that 
person's own name or a common trade name, and the business is conducted under the 
supervision of a manager, superintendent or agent the person may be sued in the person's 
netme in any action arising out of the conduct of the business. 
(f) As used in these rules, the term plaintiff shall include a petitioner, and the term 
defendant shall include a respondent. 
2. §78-22-3. Judgment by confession authorized. A judgment by confession may 
be: entered without action, either for money due or to become due or to secure any person 
against contingent liability on behalf of the defendant, or both, in the manner prescribed 
by law. Such judgment may be entered in any court having jurisdiction for like amounts. 
3. §70A-3-419 Instruments signed for accommodation. 
(1) If an instrument is issued for value given for the benefit of a party to the 
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instrument, the "accommodated party," and another party to the instrument, the 
"accommodation party," signs the instrument for the purpose of incurring liability on the 
instrument without being a direct beneficiary of the value given for the instrument, the 
instrument is signed by the accommodation party "for accommodation." 
(2) An accommodation party may sign the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, 
or indorser and, subject to Subsection (4), is obliged to pay the instrument in the capacity 
in which the accommodation party signs. The obligation of an accommodation party may 
be enforced notwithstanding any statute of frauds and whether or not the accommodation 
peirty receives consideration for the accommodation. 
(3) A person signing an instrument is presumed to be an accommodation party and 
there is notice that the instrument is signed for accommodation if the signature is an 
anomalous indorsement or is accompanied by words indicating that the signer is acting as 
surety or guarantor with respect to the obligation of another party to the instrument. 
Except as provided in Section 70A-3-605, the obligation of an accommodation party to 
pay the instrument is not affected by the fact that the person enforcing the obligation had 
notice when the instrument was taken by that person that the accommodation party signed 
the instrument for accommodation. 
(4) If the signature of a party to an instrument is accompanied by words indicating 
unambiguously that the party is guaranteeing collection rather than payment of the 
obligation of another party to the instrument, the signer is obliged to pay the amount due 
on the instrument to a person entitled to enforce the instrument only if execution of 
judgment against the other party has been returned unsatisfied, the other party is insolvent 
or in an insolvency proceeding, the other party cannot be served with process, or it is 
otherwise apparent that payment cannot be obtained from the other party. 
(5) An accommodation party who pays the instrument is entitled to reimbursement 
from the accommodated party and is entitled to enforce the instrument against the 
accommodated party. An accommodated party who pays the instrument has no right of 
rec ourse against, and is not entitled to contribution from, an accommodation party. 
4. Glauser Storage v. Smedlev. Case No. 990544-CA, Filed May 3, 2001, 2001 UT 
Appl41, 
EVIDENCE CONCERNING [DALE T.] SMEDLEY'S REPUTATION 
f28. Smedley challenges the trial court's decision to allow two witnesses to testify as to 
his general reputation for truthfulness in his community. The applicable rule states: The 
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion 
or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only 
after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or 
reputation evidence or otherwise. Utah R. Evid. 608(a). "Opinion testimony concerning 
credibility must be limited to testimony addressing a witness's general reputation for 
truthfulness, leaving the resolution of credibility for the fact-finder." State v. Hoyt, 806 
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P.2d 204, 211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added). As long as the testimony relates 
only to the general reputation for truthfulness of a witness, it is admissible under the rule. 
f29. At trial, plaintiffs presented two character witnesses on rebuttal: John Scott Carter, 
Layton City Community Development Director, and Beverly Olson, a real estate agent in 
Davis County. Each testified, in almost identical language, that Smedley did not have a 
reputation for truthfulness. 
5. Countrybrook Subdivision Unit No. 3 was created in or about October 1995 
through May 1997 by Dale T. Smedley, Terry Smedley, Mountain West Title Company 
and Chambers, it is approximately 1.2 acres of the original res of the trust [a Weber 
County ownership plat is attached hereto as ATTACHMENT "D" as if fully set forth by 
this reference]. 
6. §78-22-1. Duration of judgment — Judgment as a lien upon real property — 
Abstract of judgment — Small claims judgment not a lien — Appeal of judgment — 
Child support orders. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (6), judgments shall continue for eight years from 
the date of entry in a court unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the 
judgment is stayed in accordance with law. 
(2) Prior to July 1, 1997, except as limited by Subsections (4) and (5), the entry of 
judgment by a district court creates a lien upon the real property of the judgment debtor, 
not exempt from execution, owned or acquired during the existence of the judgment, 
located in the county in which the judgment is entered. 
(3) An abstract of judgment issued by the court in which the judgment is entered may be 
filed in any court of this state and shall have the same force and effect as a judgment 
entered in that court. 
(4) Prior to July 1, 1997, and after May 15, 1998, a judgment entered in the small claims 
division of any court shall not qualify as a lien upon real property unless abstracted to the 
civil division of the district court and recorded in accordance with Subsection (3). 
(5) (a) If any judgment is appealed, upon deposit, with the court where the notice of 
appeal is filed, of cash or other security in a form and amount considered sufficient by the 
court that rendered the judgment to secure the full amount of the judgment, together with 
ongoing interest and any other anticipated damages or costs, including attorney's fees and 
costs on appeal, the lien created by the judgment shall be terminated as provided in 
Subsection (5)(b). 
(b) Upon the deposit of sufficient security as provided in Subsection (5)(a), the court shall 
enter an order terminating the lien created by the judgment and granting the judgment 
creditor a perfected lien in the deposited security as of the date of the original judgment. 
(6) Enforcement of a child support order may be pursued at any time within four years 
after the date the youngest child reaches majority. 
(7) (a) After July 1, 2002, a judgment entered by a district court or a justice court in the 
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state becomes a lien upon real property if: 
(I) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment containing the information identifying the 
judgment debtor as described in Subsection 78-22-1.5(4) is recorded in the office of the 
county recorder; or 
(ii) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment and a separate information statement of 
the judgment creditor as described in Subsection 78-22-1.5(5) is recorded in the office of 
the county recorder. 
(b) The judgment shall run from the date of entry by the district court or justice court. 
©) The real property subject to the lien includes all the real property of the judgment debtor: 
(I) in the county in which the recording under Subsection (7)(a)(I) or (ii) occurs; and 
(ii) owned or acquired at any time by the judgment debtor during the time the judgment is 
effective. 
(d) State agencies are exempt from the recording requirement of Subsection (7)(a). 
(8) (a) A judgment referred to in Subsection (7) shall be entered under the name of the 
judgment debtor in the judgment index in the office of the county recorder as required in 
Section 17-21-6.(b) A judgment containing a legal description shall also be abstracted in 
the appropriate 
7. §78-22a-l. Short title. This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah 
Foreign Judgment Act." 
8. §70A-3-604 Discharge by cancellation or renunciation. (1) A person entitled to 
enforce an instrument, with or without consideration, may discharge the obligation of a 
pcirty to pay the instrument by an intentional voluntary act, such as surrender of the 
instrument to the party, destruction, mutilation, or cancellation of the instrument, 
cancellation or striking out of the party's signature, or the addition of words to the 
instrument indicating discharge, or by agreeing not to sue or otherwise renouncing rights 
against the party by a signed writing. 
(2) Cancellation or striking out of an indorsement pursuant to Subsection (1) does 
not affect the status and rights of a party derived from the indorsement. 
9. §57-9-4. Filing of notice of claim Qf interest authorized — Effect of possession 
of land by record owner of possessory interest. (1) Any person claiming an interest in 
land may preserve and keep effective such interest by filing for record during the forty-
year period immediately following the effective date of the root of title of the person 
whose record title would otherwise be marketable, a notice in writing, duly verified by 
oath, setting forth the nature of the claim. No disability or lack of knowledge of any kind 
on the part of anyone shall suspend the running of the forty-year period. The notice may 
be filed for record by the claimant or by any other person acting in behalf of any claimant 
who is 
(a) under a disability, 
(b) unable to assert a claim on his own behalf, or 
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(c) one of a class, but whose identity cannot be established or is uncertain at the time of 
filing the notice of claim for record. 
(2) If the same record owner of any possessory interest in land has been in possession of 
such land continuously for a period of forty years or more, during which period no title 
transaction with respect to such interest appears of record in his chain of title, and no 
notice has been filed by him or on his behalf as provided in Subsection (1), and such 
possession continues to the time when marketability is being determined, such period of 
possession shall be deemed equivalent to the filing of the notice immediately preceding 
the termination of the forty-year period described in Subsection (1). 
io. §57-3-102. Record imparts notice — Change in interest rate — Validity 
of document — Notice of unnamed interests - Conveyance by grantee. 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner prescribed by 
this title, each original document or certified copy of a document complying with Section 
574a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a notice of location complying with 
Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement complying with Section 70A-9a-502, 
whether or not acknowledged shall, from the time of recording with the appropriate 
county recorder, impart notice to all persons of their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest rate in 
accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying secured 
obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the document provided under 
Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to the parties to 
the; document and all other persons who have notice of the document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration, names the 
grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without naming beneficiaries or 
stating the terms of the trust does not charge any third person with notice of any interest 
of the grantor or of the interest of any other person not named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to him free and 
clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he appears as grantee or in any 
other document recorded in accordance with this title that sets forth the names of the 
beneficiaries, specifies the interest claimed, and describes the real property subject to the 
interest. 
n. §57-3-103. Effect of failure to record. 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any subsequent 
purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
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12. §48-1-38 Liability of persons continuing the business in certain cases. 
(1) When any new partner is admitted into an existing partnership, or when any partner 
retires and assigns (or the representatives of a deceased partner assign) his rights in 
partnership property to two or more of the partners, or to one or more of the partners and 
one or more third persons, if the business is continued without liquidation of the 
partnership affairs, creditors of the first, or dissolved, partnership are also creditors of the 
partnership so continuing the business. 
(2) When all but one partner retire and assign (or the representatives of a deceased partner 
assign) their rights in partnership property to the remaining partner, who continues the 
business without liquidation of partnership affairs either alone or with others, creditors of 
the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person or partnership so continuing the business. 
(3) When any partner retires or dies and the business of the dissolved partnership is 
continued, as set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this section, with the consent of the 
retired partner or the representatives of the deceased partner, but without any assignment 
of his right in partnership property, rights of creditors of the dissolved partnership and of 
creditors of the person or partnership continuing the business shall be as if such 
assignment had been made. 
(4) When all the partners or their representatives assign their rights in partnership 
property to one or more third persons who promise to pay the debts and who continue the 
business of the dissolved partnership, creditors of the dissolved partnership are also 
creditors of the person or partnership continuing the business. 
(5) When any partner wrongfully causes a dissolution and the remaining partners continue 
the business under the provisions of Section 48-1-35 (2)(b), either alone or with others 
and without liquidation of the partnership affairs, creditors of the dissolved partnership 
are also creditors of the person or partnership continuing the business. 
(6) When a partner is expelled and the remaining partners continue the business, either 
alone or with others, without liquidation of the partnership affairs, creditors of the 
dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person or partnership continuing the business. 
(7) The liability of a third person becoming a partner in the partnership continuing the 
business under this section, to the creditors of the dissolved partnership shall be satisfied 
ou: of partnership property only. 
(8) When the business of a partnership after dissolution is continued under any conditions 
set forth in this section, the creditors of the dissolved partnership, as against the separate 
creditors of the retiring or deceased partner or the representatives of the deceased partner, 
have a prior right to any claim of the retired partner or the representatives of the deceased 
partner against the person or partnership continuing the business on account of the retired 
or deceased partner's interest in the dissolved partnership, or on account of any 
consideration promised for such interest, or for his right in partnership property. 
(9) Nothing in this section shall be held to modify any right of creditors to set aside any 
ass ignment on the ground of fraud. 
(10) The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership 
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name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the 
individual property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person 
or partnership. 
13. Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time 
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive 
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may 
so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his 
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall 
be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days 
after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the 
court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if 
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may be 
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made 
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does 
no1: affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. 
The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended 
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be 
set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original 
pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable 
notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading 
setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date of 
the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the 
original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court 
deems it advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so 
order, specifying the time therefor. 
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ATTACHMENT "C" 
PART OF THE N.W. 1/4 OF SECTION 16, T.5N., R.2W„ S.LB. &c M. 
COUNTRYBROOK NO. 3 SUBDIVISION 
3971 
IN ROY CITY 
SCALE 1" - 30* 
SEE PAGE 331 
S 89-38*19" E 151.75* 
PACE 72-2 
SEE PAGE 72-2 
SFF PAHF 79^-9 
ATTACHMENT"D' FOR COMPLETE ENG DATA SEE ORIGINAL DEDICATION PLAT IN BOOK 43. PACE 61 OF RECORDS. 
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?S P^S^J?^ 000€ OWFTSt SEBER COUNTY RECORDER 
LYNN A . J E N K I N S i3~SEP~?? 23? HI FEE « 2 , 0 G 0EP fftf 
3 East 2750 South REG FOR-* LrHK.ft.JEHKIHS 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone (801) 299-1513 
NOTICE OF REAL AND\OR PERSONAL PROPERTY INTERESTS IN 
WEBER COUNTY, UTAH 
Notice is hereby given Jay LYNN A JENKINS I., Three East 
2750 South, Bountiful, Utah 84010, he claims an interest in the 
real and/or personal property which is the subject matter, of three 
civil actions pending, in the District Courts of the Second 
Judicial District, for Weber, Davis and Morgan Counties, state of 
Utah, which actions are affecting his rights (real and/or 
personal), claims (real and/or personal), title (real and/or 
personal) and/or other interests (real and/or personal) in such 
property located in Weber County, Utah, more particularly described 
as follows: 
Beginning a point South 0o01'30H West,660 feet and North 
89o41' East 1328.38 feet from the Northwest corner of Section 16, 
Township 5 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence 
North 89o41v East 271.60 feet, thence South OoOl'3'O" West 308.11 
feet, thence South 26o04*2 " West 67.08 feet, thence South 
19o54'21" East 318.08 feet, thence South 89o30f30" West 686.95 feet 
to the Southeast corner of COUNTRYBROOK SUBDIVISION UNIT NO. 1$ 
thence North 20o45'38" East 106.32 feet, thence North 37o05'55" 
East 83.57 feet, thence North 52o41,58" East 63.56 feet, thence 
North 34o29'37- East 163.44 feet, thence North 43o02'47- East 83.07 
feet, thence North 24o48'll" East 125.27 feet, *(thence South 
89041"00" west 2.94 feet), thence North 0ol9'00N west 160 feet to 
the Northeast corner of said COUNTRYBROOK SUBDIVISION UNIT NO. 1, 
and point of beginning. 
FURTHER, the property as placed in trust by Lynn A. Jenkins 
I., the successor and President of Residential Mortgage Inc., a 
Utah corporation, with B H B B K ^ ^ e p ^ 'M. Chambers Esq., was for 
subdivision development with^|^|^|Q||||^y^^' " M ^ 4 H H H H H H 
and relates to the subject matter of two civil -s pending in 
the District Court of Lemhi County, state of Idaho, which actions 
relate to Residential Mortgage's Trust on or about July 20, 1990, 
by 
in 
1. IDAHO COMPLAINT captioned "COMPLAINT TO FORECLOSE 
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE", KEB ENTERPRISES, L.P., a Utah limited 
jpartnership. v. DALE T. SMEDLEY and HELEN B. JSMEDLEY, husband and 
wife; WOLFLEY BROTHERS, a partnership consisting of KIM M. WOLFLEY, 
DeLOY E. WOLFLEY. and MONTY D. WOLFLEY; KIM M. WOLFLEY and LaRUB 
WOLFLEY, husband and wife; DeLOY E. WOLFLEY and MARIA WOLFLEY. 
husband and wife; and MONTY D. WOLFLEY and LA TAWN WOLFLEY, husband 
and wife; STEVEN CARL SHRADER and DIANE MARIE SHRADER; WALTER G. 
A TTACHMENT "G" 
&&t>l 
HAGG: RICHARD BARTON and AMY BARTON, husband and wife: KEVIN JAY 
KELLER and MARY JO KELLER, husband and wife; EDWIN M. HIGLEY; 
BARTON FAMILY TRUST: CARL SYMONS WHITE and JANET GRACE BALICE: and 
CLENDEN T, BYBEE, Case No. CV-98-70. Said action was filed on 
April 16, 1998, which seeks foreclosure of an alleged PROMISSORY 
NOTE, in the amount of $112,000.00, dated November 29, 1977, 
interest only payable on December 1, 1977, and thereafter in 35 
equal installments of Ten Thousand One Hundred and 22/100 DOLLARS 
each year thereafter commencing on the first day of December 1978, 
and the final installment payable on the first day of December, 
2012. 
2. IDAHO COMPLAINT captioned "VERIFIED COMPLAINT", MARY 
S» JENSEN, formerly known as Mary S. Barton, acting not 
individually but as Trustee of the Barton Family Trust created 
under Trust Agreement executed by Mary Barton on January 10, 1991, 
and executed by Walter E. Barton on May 31, 1988, v. KEB 
ENTERPRISES, L.P», a Utah limited partnership, EDWIN M. HIGLEY and 
AFTON C. HIGLEY, husband and wife; DALE T. SMEDLEY and HELEN B. 
SMEDLEY, husband and wife; and SMEDLEY INV., CO., a Partnership. 
Case No. CV-98-101. Said action was filed on May 27, 1998, which 
seeks specific performance for the sale of a portion of said real 
property, and further requests the court to quiet title. 
The actions arose from the failure of the BARTON FAMILY TRUST 
to perform as agreed by Walter E. Barton and his wife, Mary S. 
Barton of the sale and/or transfer of the real and/or personal 
property, and by the failure of the BARTON FAMILY TRUST to complete 
the transfers and/or exchanges as agreed, affecting the Salmon 
Idaho property. 
Dated this /3> ^ day of September, 1999. 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of JlflilK 
) 
) ss 
) 
E* 1 6 A 2 0 4 S BK2Q33 PG20A2 
On the Yp day of September, 1999, personally appeared before 
me LYNN A. JENKINS I*, being by me duly sworn, acknowledged that he 
executed the foregoing NOTICE OF REAL AND\OR PERSONAL PROPERTY 
INTERESTS IN WEBER COUNTY, UTAH. 
KR1S7EN NEtSON 
*b58 North ?53()VVt-s? 
Cbnlon, UT840?$ 
My Comnvssion F v e » 
August 5. 2(k j 
IMA 
Notary Public for Utah 
Residing at: (ffi(/j(
 j m , , w , 
My Commission Expires; (11U% i? Yui)}' 
A TTACHMENT "G" 
Page 2 
Ijmig 
Ml: 40,188,313,320 
SECTION 16, T.5N., R.2W., S.LB. & M. 
IN ROY CITY & WEBER COUNTY 
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SETTLEMENT ON SEPTEMBER 13, 1999, NOTICE OF ^^fy
 d o n . by Tmy D . S m . d , . -
INTEREST A TTACHMENT "J" 
LYNN A. JENKINS I., pro se 
3 East 2750 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801)299-1520 t , - c / '
 /
 / I • : «*• 
IN THE OGDEN COURT, WEBER COUNTY 
OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
TERRY SMEDLEY; and 
COUNTRYBROOK L.L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
LYNN A. JENKINS, I., 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 000900778 
RECEIVED 
APR 2 3 2002 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Notice is hereby given that defendant and appellant, Lynn A. Jenkins, pro se, appeals to 
the Utah Supreme Court the final judgment of the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor entered in this 
matter on April 11, 2002. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
DATED this^>~ day of April, 2002. 
Lyrm Atflenkih^J. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Lynn A. Jenkins, certify that on the ^2-^fday of April, 2002,1 placed in the US Mail, 
postage prepaid a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, to the 
following: 
Laura Scott Esq., 
John B. Wilson Esq., 
PARSON, BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
PO Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
nov y. 18 i';i uu 
JOHN B.WILSON (3511) 
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
*0 ZQQQ 
TERRY SMEDLEY; and 
COUNTRYBROOK, L.L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company,, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LYNN A. JENKINS, I., 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER GRANTING 
PLAINTIFFS' PETITIONS TO 
NULLIFY WRONGFUL LIENS 
AND RELEASING LIENS FROM 
THE PROPERTY 
Case No. 000900778 
Judge Stanton M. Tavlor 
* * * * * * * 
Plaintiffs Terry Smedley ("Smedley") and Countrybrook, L.L.C.'s ("Countrybrook") 
(collectively "Plaintiffs") Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien and Supplemental Petition to Nullify 
Wrongful Liens came for oral argument before the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor on October 2, 
2000. Plaintiffs were represented by Laura S. Scott of Parsons Behle & Latimer. Defendant 
Lynn A. Jenkins, I. ("Jenkins") appeared pro se. 
363510.1 
After considering the memoranda, affidavit and exhibits submitted by the parties and 
hearing oral argument, the Court hereby enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Smedley was the fee simple owner of approximately 4.93 acres of certain real 
property located in Weber County, State of Utah ("Property"), more particularly described as 
follows: 
BEGINNING at a point South 0°01'30" West 660 feet and North 
89°41' East 1531.28 feet from the Northwest corner of Section 16, 
Township 5 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
thence North 89°41' East 68.70 feet, thence South 0°01'30" West 
308.11 feet, thence South 26°04'24" West 67.08 feet, thence South 
19°54'21" East 318.08 feet, thence South 89°30'30M West 686.95 
feet to the Southeast corner of COUNTRYBROOK 
SUBDIVISION UNIT NO. 1, THENCE North 20°45'38" East 
106.32 feet, thence North 37°05'55" East 83.57 feet, thence North 
52°41'58" East 63.56 feet, thence North 34°29*37" East 163.44 
feet, thence North 43°02'47" East 83.07 feet, thence South 
29°33'51" East 7.50 feet; thence along the arc of a 141 foot radius 
curve to the right 73.64 feet (LC-North 75°23'53" East 72.80 feet) 
thence South 89°38'19" East 148.12 feet; thence along the arc of a 
30.01 foot radius curve to the left 47.44 feet (LC-North 45°31'11" 
East 42.75 feet) thence North 00°40'41" East 230.00 feet to 
BEGINNING. 
2. Through a series of conveyances on December 26, 1997 and June 8, 1999, 
Smedley conveyed a portion of the Property (the "Roy Parcel") to the City of Roy pursuant to 
five (5) separate Warranty Deeds. 
363510.1 2 
3. On July 20, 1999, Plaintiffs conveyed a portion of the Property ("Country West 
Parcel") to Country West Construction & Real Estate, Inc. ("Country West") pursuant to a 
Warranty Deed. 
4. Plaintiffs retained fee title to the remainder of the Property ("Countrybrook 
Parcel"). 
5. On or about September 13, 1999, Jenkins recorded a Notice of Real and/or 
Personal Property Interests on the Property, including the Country West Parcel, the 
Countrybrook Parcel, and the Roy Parcel ("Notice of Interest"). The Notice of Interest was 
recorded in Weber County as Entry.No. 1662048 in Book 2033 at Pages 2061-62. 
6. On September 24, 1999, Plaintiffs gave Jenkins written notice that the Notice of 
Interest was a wrongful lien on the Property. Jenkins did not remove the Notice of Interest 
within twenty (20) days of the written notice. 
7. On or about November 23, 1999, Jenkins executed a Partial Release of Notice of 
Interest and Quit Claim Deed releasing the Notice of Interest from the Country West Parcel in 
exchange for Plaintiffs' placement of $30,000 in an escrow account with Bonneville Title 
Company, Inc. which would serve as substitute property for the Country West Parcel. 
8. The Notice of Interest is not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document 
signed by the owner of the Property; (b) expressly authorized by a state or federal statute; or (c) 
authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in this 
state. 
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9. The Notice of Interest was not filed in connection with an action affecting the title 
to or the right of possession of the Property. 
10. On or about July 31, 2000, Jenkins recorded over twenty additional documents on 
the Property, including letters from attorneys, stipulations, orders, a title commitment, a 
certificate of limited partnership and certificates of authority ("Recorded Documents"). The 
Recorded Documents were recorded in Weber County as Entry No. 1718590 in Book 2084 at 
Pages 473-526. 
11. The Recorded Documents are not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to a 
document signed by the owner of the Property; (b) expressly authorized by a state or federal 
statute; or (c) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in this state. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Notice of Interest is a wrongful lien under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 et seq. 
because it is not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the 
property; (b) expressly authorized by a state or federal statute; or (c) authorized by or contained 
in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in this state. 
2. The Notice of Interest is not a valid lis pendens because it was not filed in 
connection with an action affecting the title to or the right of possession of the Property. 
3. The Recorded Documents are wrongful liens under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 et 
seq. because they are not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner 
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of the Property; (b) expressly authorized by a state or federal statute; or (c) authorized by or 
contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in this state. 
4. Plaintiffs are entitled to the sum of $30,000, plus any accrued interest, which was 
deposited in an escrow account with Bonneville Title Company, Inc. (Escrow No. 71543-2W) 
pursuant to the Partial Release of Notice of Interest executed by Jenkins and recorded on December 
3,1999, in Weber County as Entry No. 1677492 in Book 2047 at Pages 612-15. 
5. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4, Jenkins liable to Plaintiffs for damages and 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 
Therefore, the Court, being fully advised in the premises, and for good cause appearing, 
hereby ORDERS: 
1. Plaintiffs' Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien and Supplemental Petition to Nullify 
Wrongful Liens are granted and judgment is hereby entered: 
a. Declaring that the Notice of Interest is a wrongful lien on the Property and 
therefore void ab initio; and 
b. Declaring that the Recorded Documents are wrongful liens on the Property 
and therefore void ab initio. 
2. The Notice of Interest and Recorded Documents are hereby released from the 
Property. 
3. Bonneville Title Company, Inc. shall immediately pay to Plaintiffs the sum of 
$30,000, plus any accrued interest, which was deposited in an escrow account with Bonneville Title 
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Company, Inc. (Escrow No. 71543-2W) pursuant to the Partial Release of Notice of Interest 
executed by Jenkins and recorded on December 3,1999, in Weber County as Entry No. 1677492 in 
Book 2047 at Pages 612-15. 
4. The amount of damages and attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded to Plaintiffs 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4 is reserved for future determination. 
DATED this 7/ day of Yb$s& 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Stanton,'M. Taylor 
Second Judicial District Court 
H 
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JOHN B.WILSON (3511) 
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
TERRY SMEDLEY; and 
COUNTRYBROOK, L.L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LYNN A. JENKINS, I.,, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER AWARDING DAMAGES, 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
Case No. 000900778 
Judge Stanton M. Taylor 
* * * * * * * 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to plaintiffs Terry Smedley and 
Countrybrook, L.L.C.'s ("Plaintiffs") Notice to Submit filed on December 11, 2001. Pending 
before the Court was Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Awarding Damages, Attorneys' Fees and 
Costs, which was filed on June 18, 2001. A Supplemental Memorandum and the Affidavits of 
Terry Smedly, Laura S. Scott and T. Richard Davis were filed in support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Order Awarding Damages, Attorneys' Fees and Costs. 
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The Court previously entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting 
Plaintiffs' Petition to Nullify Wrongful Liens and Releasing Liens from the Property on 
November 30, 2002, declaring that defendant Lynn Jenkins' ("Jenkins") Notice of Interest 
recorded September 13, 1999 and the Recorded Documents recorded on July 31, 2000 were 
wrongful liens, and quieting title in the real property which is the subject of this action 
("Property") in favor of Plaintiffs. The Court at that time reserved for future determination the 
amount of damages and attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded to Plaintiffs pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §38-9-4. 
On September 10, 2001, the Court heard oral argument on Plaintiffs' Motion for Order 
Awarding Damages, Attorneys' Fees and Costs. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court 
requested that Plaintiffs submit a supplemental affidavit to clarify certain issues raised by 
Jenkins regarding their claims for damages. Plaintiffs filed the Supplemental Affidavit of Terry 
Smedley on December 11, 2001. Jenkins did not file a response to the Supplemental Affidavit. 
After hearing oral argument and reviewing the memoranda and affidavits submitted by the 
parties, the Court issued its Decision granting the Motion for Order Awarding Damages, 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs on January 15, 2002 and requested that counsel for Plaintiffs prepare 
findings, an order and a judgment in accordance with its Decision. 
Pursuant to its Decision of January 15, 2002 and for other good cause appearing, the 
Court hereby enters its: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court previously found that the Notice of Interest recorded by Jenkins on 
September 13, 1999 and the Recorded Documents recorded by JenJcins on July 31, 2000 were 
wrongful liens because they were not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed 
by the owner of the Property; (b) expressly authorized by a state or federal statute; or (c) 
authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in this 
state. 
2. As a result of the wrongful liens recorded by Jenkins, Plaintiffs were unable to 
commence construction of improvements to Phase 10 of the Property. 
3. It took approximately one year to obtain an Order releasing the Notice of Interest 
and the Recorded Documents from the Property. During this period of time, oil prices increased 
substantially, as did prices for asphalt, PVC pipe, and other oil-related products. Consequently, 
the cost of improvements to Phase 10 increased by $13,550.50. 
4. Although the fair market value of the lots in Phase 10 may have increased during 
the period from September 1999 to December 2000, Plaintiffs were not able to take advantage of 
any increase in fair market value because they were contractually obligated to sell the lots in 
Phase 10 to Greg Higley dba Country West Construction and Real Estate for $33,000 per lot 
pursuant to an agreement negotiated in September 1999. 
5. Plaintiffs have suffered actual damages in the amount of $13,550.50 as a result of 
the wrongful liens recorded by Jenkins. 
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6. Plaintiffs are represented by John B. Wilson and Laura S. Scott, both members in 
good standing of the Utah State Bar, of the firm of Parsons Behle & Latimer. John Wilson has 
over twenty years of experience. Laura Scott has over eight years of experience. Both have 
considerable experience with real estate title litigation. 
7. During 2000, John Wilson's hourly rate was $200.00 per hour and Laura Scott's 
hourly rate was $150.00 per hour. During 2001, John Wilson's hourly rate was $225.00 per hour 
and Laura Scott's hourly rate was $170.00. These are the hourly rates customarily charged by 
Parsons Behle & Latimer for this type of legal work and the Court finds them to be reasonable. 
8. Prior to the employment of Parsons Behle & Latimer, Callister Nebeker & 
McCullough was retained by Plaintiffs to send a demand letter to defendant Lynn Jenkins 
("Jenkins") to release the wrongful liens and to file the Complaint. 
9. Plaintiffs' counsel Laura Scott has submitted sworn affidavits in conformance 
with Rule 4-505 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration setting forth a detailed statement of 
work performed in connection with this matter. This work included preparing briefs and 
affidavits in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Hearing on Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien, 
preparing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and responding to Jenkins' objections 
thereto, responding to Jenkins' Motion for New Trial, and preparing for and attending two 
hearings in Ogden, Utah. The Court finds that such work was reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute this matter. 
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10. In performing this work, Laura Scott and her firm expended 83.60 hours. Her 
firm's fee for these services is $13,360.50. Laura Scott and her firm also incurred $459.06 in 
costs related to this action. 
11. Callister Nebeker & McCullough incurred $6,901.25 in attorneys' fees for 
sending the written demand, filing the Complaint and other related legal services. 
12. Pursuant to the four factors discussed in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 
985 (Utah 1988), the Court finds that Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in the amount of $20,261.75 are 
reasonable because: 
a. The affidavits of Laura S. Scott and T. Richard Davis in support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Awarding Damages and Attorneys' Fees and Costs set forth a 
detailed record of the legal work actually performed including the number of hours spent by each 
attorney for each task performed; 
b. The billing rates of counsel for Plaintiffs are consistent with the rates 
customarily charged in Weber County and Salt Lake County for legal services of this type; 
c. The amounts and type of work performed by counsel for Plaintiffs were 
reasonable and necessary because: (i) counsel for Plaintiffs successfully brought an action to 
nullify Jenkins' wrongful liens; (ii) counsel for Plaintiffs asked Jenkins to voluntarily release the 
wrongful liens; (iii) Jenkins asserted numerous arguments in defense of his liens and it was 
necessary for counsel for Plaintiffs to research and brief each argument. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
13. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4 (2), Plaintiffs are entitled to an order 
awarding them damages in the amount of $13,550 together with their reasonable attorneys' fees 
and costs. 
14. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs' costs of $459.06 incurred in this action are 
reasonable and necessary. 
15. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees incurred in this action, as set 
forth in the affidavits of Laura S. Scott and T. Richard Davis, are reasonable, appropriate and 
warranted in this case. 
16. The Court declines to treble the damages awarded to Plaintiffs because it believes 
that to do so would be an unlawful penalty. 
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment declaring that the Notice of Interest and 
Recorded Documents are wrongful liens on the Property and void ab inito and that fee simple 
title to the Property is quieted in favor of Plaintiffs Terry Smedley and Countrybrook, L.L.C. and 
against Defendant Lynn A. Jenkins, I and all persons claiming by, through or under him. 
2. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment for damages against defendant Lynn Jenkins 
in the amount of $13,550. 
3. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment for reasonable attorneys' fees against 
defendant Lynn Jenkins in the amount of $20,261.75. 
448665.1 6 
4. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment for costs against defendant Lynn Jenkins in 
the amount of $459.06. A 
DATED this 0 day of 6W4i/ ,2002. 
BY THE COU 
Honorable Stanto 
Second Judicial 
448665.1 
